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I.

INTRODUCTION

N A TRAGIC Friday morning in July 1983, a Waterfront Airways Cessna seaplane collided with a Bell police helicopter six hundred feet over Brooklyn, New York.1
The impact severed the tail section of the seaplane and tore
off the rotor blades on the helicopter. Left without its stabilizing rear rotor, the helicopter pitched violently into an
abandoned apartment building, killing the two policemen
on board as it plummeted to the ground. Two of the seaplane's passengers were luckier. The dark waters of New
York Harbor cushioned its crash, preventing an explosion
and allowing them to escape.
Joseph Stamler and Eileen McCarthy, commuters traveling aboard the seaplane, lived through the nightmarish incident. The two Wall Street investment bankers frequently
took the Waterfront Airways charter between Highlands,
New Jersey, and the East River area of Wall Street as an alternative to the crowded New York streets.2 The crash of
the seaplane, which also killed its pilot and a third passenger, left Mr. Stamler with head lacerations and shattered
vertebrae. Ms. McCarthy suffered fractured ribs, a broken
pelvis, and internal bleeding. Nevertheless, in light of the
deaths involved, they considered themselves fortunate.
What is unfortunate was that the complexities of the federal jurisdictional system eventually left Mr. Stamler and
For an account of the Waterfront Airways accident, see Deirdre Carmody, Four
Believed Killed As Police Copter and Plane Crash Over Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1983,
at Al; see also Douglas C. McGill, Two Bodies Found in Sunken Plane, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 1983, at A22.
2 According to the New York Metropolitan Area Transportation Department,
there were about 8000 commuter seaplane flights in and out of the New York City
area each year. Id.
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Ms. McCarthy without recourse in the federal district
courts.3 No clear legal framework has ever provided for
federal jurisdiction over aviation torts. 4 Instead, cases involving aviation torts find solace in federal courts via diversity or admiralty jurisdiction. 5 Furthermore, many suits
involving aircraft disasters may fall under federal admiralty
jurisdiction by virtue of the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA).6 Successfully asserting admiralty jurisdiction
3 See City of New York v. Waterfront Airways, 620 F. Supp. 411 (D.C.N.Y. 1985),
discussed infra at notes 82-89 and accompanying text. Since the plaintiff passengers
and defendant Waterfront Airways were all New Jersey residents, no diversity jurisdiction existed and any federal jurisdiction had to be predicated upon admiralty
jurisdiction. Lack of admiralty jurisdiction became grounds for dismissal of the suit.
Id.
See Kyle Brackin, Comment, Salvaging the Wreckage: Multidistrict Litigation and
Aviation, 57J. AIR L. & CoM. 655, 702-07 (1992);JohnJ. Kennelly, The Evaluation of
an Aviation Casefrom the Standpoint of the Plaintiff,in LrrIGATING THE AVIATION CASE 34 Juanita M. Madole ed., 1987).
- Federal courts of the United States have jurisdiction extending "to all Cases...
of admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction ... [and) to Controversies between two or
more States... [or] between a State and Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. A background of admiralty law and the benefits surrounding its application are discussed in part II.A., infra. Plaintiffs and defendants may both find
benefits in filing cases under the admiralty label. Id.
Although this comment concerns itself primarily with admiralty/aviation jurisdictional issues, the problems of finding in personam jurisdiction when out-of-state aviation corporations are involved deserve some mention. Aviation suits commonly
incorporate personal jurisdiction issues when litigated in state courts. See Randal R.
Craft, Jr., Overview of Recent Developments Affecting General Aviation Accident Litigation,

in ARCRAF-

CRASH LITIGATION

1984, 41 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Hand-

book Series No. 267, 1984). Indeed, two of the landmark cases elaborating on the in
personam issue involve aircraft manufacturers. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding that Texas could not assert general
jurisdiction over a Colombian helicopter company since the mere sending of Colombian employees to Texas for temporary training did not constitute continuous
and systematic general business contacts); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981) (holding that choice of law rules should not be given weight in an exercise of
discretion for a forum non conveniens request). Such complex issues only further
illustrate the need for uniformity in the aviation litigation context. See discussion at
part IV, infra.
6 Section 761 of the Death on the High Seas Act provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district
courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against
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gives plaintiffs substantive and procedural advantages not
otherwise available in either federal or state courts when
other jurisdictional grounds are pled.7 Statutes such as
DOHSA can provide a bright-line basis for finding appropriate jurisdiction in admiralty.'
In other circumstances, the line blurs considerably.
When aviation torts occur within territorial waters, as in the
Waterfront Airways accident, proper jurisdiction becomes
the proverbial "shot in the dark." In the absence of specific
statutory legislation providing for federal jurisdiction over
aviation issues, the federal courts have relied on a confusing
array of tests to determine whether admiralty provisions
should control. 9 Plaintiffs such as Mr. Stamler and Ms. Mcthe vessel; person, or corporation which would have been liable if
death had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988) (emphasis added). Since DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy available for deaths arising from accidents occurring beyond one
marine league from shore, the imposition of admiraltyjurisdiction can cause a plaintiff's state wrongful death claim to be pre-empted. See Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986), discussed infra at notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
7 See notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
8 It is important to distinguish between the DOHSA remedies, which constitute a
statutory action in admiralty, and common-law maritime remedies. Prior to the 1920
enactment of DOHSA, the general maritime law in the United States offered no
remedy for wrongful death (as stated in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886)).
Claims for wrongful death remedies may therefore be predicated only upon statutory authority encompassing general admiralty law, rather than admiralty per se. See
part III.A., infta.
9 For excellent discussions of this topic covering years prior to 1983, see Carolyn
Daigle Wiggins, Comment, Admiralty JurisdictionRelated to MaritimeAviation Accidents,
48J. AIR L. & COM. 179 (1982); Birdwell & Whitten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Outlook for the Doctrine of Executive Jet, 1974 DuKE L.J. 757; James F. Mosely, Did That
Airplane Affect Admiralty: Executive Jet and its Aftermath, 25 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 319
(1975); Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction: ExecutiveJet in HistoricalPerspective, 34 OHIO ST.
L.J. 355 (1973).
The confusion surrounding proper admiralty jurisdiction prevails, quite understandably, in traditional maritime contexts. While this comment concentrates on
aviation issues, many commentators have examined the influence of recent federal
cases that have redefined the overall requirements for admiralty jurisdiction. See
Jeffrey L. Raizner, Note, Missing the Boat - Another Failed Attempt to Define Admiralty
Tort Jurisdiction: Sisson v. Ruby, 29 Hous. L. REv. 733 (1992); Joseph F. Smith, Jr.,
Choice of Law Analysis: The Solution to the Admiralty JurisdictionalDilemma, 14 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 1 (1989); Charles H. Livaudais, Cruisinginto FederalCourt: The Availability of
Federal Admiralty Jurisdictionfor Pleasure Craft Tort Cases after Foremost Insurance Co. v.
Richardson, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 347 (1988); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Comment, Admiralty
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Carthy consequently lose control over their lawsuits by virtue of the jurisdictional mess over aviation in admiralty.
This comment addresses the problems and issues that
arise when attempting to assert admiralty jurisdiction over
aviation torts. Part II briefly summarizes the history of admiralty law and its accompanying benefits. This section includes a discussion of Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland,a" the
1972 Supreme Court case which sought to provide a workable standard for the scope of admiralty jurisdiction. Part III
analyzes the most recent examples of case law interpreting
Executive Jet and will illustrate its continuing problems. Part
IV of this comment explores major issues arising following
the implementation of the Executive Jet standard. This section addresses the problems of DOHSA and state law preemption, and also a newer issue concerning the viability of
non-wrongful death suits involving aviation torts, filed
under the purported reach of admiralty. Part V then discusses possible Congressional action on proposed statutory
provisions allowing federal jurisdiction, independent from
admiralty, over all related aviation torts. In conclusion, this
comment contends that the forum of aircraft-related litigation would greatly benefit, in both efficiency and predictability, from a statutory scheme of federal jurisdiction over
aviation torts.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION
A.

WHY ADMIRALTY?

The unique circumstances surrounding maritime commerce led to the development of a separate set of laws and
rules governing transportation in navigable waters." Congress first extended jurisdiction over admiralty issues to the
Jurisdiction Over Asbestos Torts: Unknotting the Tangled Fibers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 312
(1987).
10 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
11 See generally GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, ch. 1
(2d ed. 1975); JAMES W. MooRE ET AL., 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 325[3] [5]
(2d ed. 1972).
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federal courts through section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.12 For the first 175 years following the passage of section 9, district courts kept such cases apart from other areas
of jurisdiction, and the "admiralty docket" functioned
under its own procedural workings." It was not until 1966
that the admiralty and non-admiralty dockets merged into
regular civil actions under the general provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4
The procedural rules for assertion of admiralty jurisdiction are simple enough. A claim in admiralty is either a
claim in which an admiralty ground constitutes the only basis for a suit, or a case in which admiralty jurisdiction is specially pleaded even though separate jurisdictional options
exist. 15 If the court finds no basis for admiralty jurisdiction,
and no other ground of federal jurisdiction can be stated,
the suit must be dismissed. 6
Many plaintiffs may find the common law and statutes
surrounding admiralty more favorable than the laws of
their state. One particular advantage is the three-year statute of limitations on tort actions involving wrongful
12 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77. The current jurisdictional
statute carries over substantially similar language, stating that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) [a] nycivil
case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
The "savings to suitors" clause allows a plaintiff, otherwise under personal jurisdiction of a federal court, to elect to sue in a state court under an ordinary civil action.
The state court would be required to apply the same substantive law as would apply
if the suit had been filed in a federal court. Shannon v. City of Anchorage, Alaska,
478 P.2d 815, 818 (Alaska 1970).
Is GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 19.
14 Id. at 2 (referring to the 1966 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). "Despite this 'unification', the admiralty power remains a separate and independent ground ofjurisdiction, both constitutional and statutory." Id.
1-5 Id. at 20. The pleading rules are set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h). In addition,
the Federal Rule provides that "[i]f the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an
admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes whether so identified or not." FED.
R. Crv. P. 9(h). Clearly, the plaintiff in a suit involving an aviation tort over navigable waters benefits by specially pleading admiralty jurisdiction, thus ensuring that
any admiralty claims may later be asserted.
16 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 34.
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death. 17 Plaintiffs within admiralty jurisdiction can also
avoid jury trials. t 8 Other various considerations include liberal venue provisions, comparative negligence concepts,
and limitations of liability. 19 Furthermore, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur may be available to aviation tort suits
within admiralty.20 Defendants may also benefit from moving a suit into admiralty, since a defendant in an admiralty
claim can insist that a plaintiff pursue a judgment against a
third-party defendant. 21 Thus, incentives do exist which
may compel parties in aviation tort cases to assert admiralty
jurisdiction, even if there are alternative grounds for a federal court to hear a case.
B.

OLD JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS AND THE DOCTRINE OF

EXE UTIvEJT
Prior to 1972, the test of admiralty jurisdiction more or
less depended upon the locality of the act under dispute. 2
17 46 U.S.C. app. § 763(a) (1988) provides that "a suit for recovery of damages for
personal injury or death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained unless commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrued." Claims under DOHSA brought against the United States, however, are
subject to a shorter two-year period under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA). 46
U.S.C. app. § 745 (1988). See discussion infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
18 The Seventh Amendment guarantees parties the right to ajury trial in "[s]uits
at common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. However, admiralty has traditionally
been excluded from the definition of "common law" under the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460 (1848); Green v.
Ross, 481 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973). This view takes
procedural substance within Rule 38(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states that the general Rule 38(a) jury trial guarantee "shall not be construed
to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim .... "
FED. R. Crv. P. 38(e). See Billy Coe Dyer, Note, The Juy on the Quarterdeck: The Effect
of PleadingAdmiralty Jurisdiction When a Proceeding Turns Hybrid, 63 TEX. L. REV. 533
(1986).
19 See 7AJ. MOORE, supra note 11, atl 325(5]. With respect to the liability limitations, the Warsaw Convention (as modified by the Montreal Agreement of 1966)
adds to the confusion by imposing a $75,000 limit for passenger personal injuries or
death in accidents on board an international aircraft. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement
18900, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 at 748 (1988) (approved by
CAB Order E-23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302).
2 Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983).
21 See FED. R. Crv. P. 14(c) and FED. R. Crv. P. 14 advisory committee's note.
22 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL ET AL., 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 2 at 1-6 n.7 (7th ed.
1986).
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Hence, admiralty jurisdiction would be invoked simply if
the litigated tort occurred in the high seas or navigable waters. 3 This "strict locality rule" quickly found its critics,
who argued that cases were being admitted into federal
courts based upon solely fortuitous circumstances. 24
The critics of the strict locality rule finally won over the
Supreme Court, which explicitly rejected the rule in Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland.25 This 1972 case involved an aircraft which had ingested seagulls into its engines during a
takeoff, causing it to crash into Lake Erie. 6 Although no
injuries were sustained, the plane sank and became a total
loss. The owners of the aircraft invoked admiralty jurisdiction, claiming that the city acted negligently in failing to
keep the airport free of birds.27 The District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio dismissed the complaint for lack
The case of The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865) usually receives credit for
first invoking the strict locality rule. The Supreme Court there held that "[e]very
species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the
high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." Id. at 36.
22 Gilmore summarizes the definition of navigable waters, as required by admiralty, as:
all waters, salt or fresh, with or without tides, natural or artificial,
which are in fact navigable in interstate or foreign water commerce,
whether or not the particular body of water is wholly within a state,
and whether or not the occurrence or transaction that is the subjectmatter of the suit is confined to one state.
See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 31-32. The definition of "high seas" has
relevance because under DOHSA, discussed at part IV.A., infra, the death by wrongful act must occur "on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States . . . ." 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988). In addition, it is important to note that
the Ninth Circuit has held that all waters within the territorial waters of a foreign
country be deemed as the high seas, even though territorial waters of the United
States are not so defined. Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir.
1974).
214 For a discussion of these critics, see Wiggins, supra note 9, at 179-88.
25 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
26 It is well-established that the Great Lakes and the Mississippi and its tributaries
qualify as the "navigable waters" required for admiralty jurisdiction. GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 11, at 30 (citing Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1851); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867)).
21 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 249. Asserting admiralty jurisdiction would have enabled the aircraft owners to avoid a bar imposed by the Ohio statute of limitations.
See Gutoff, supra note 9, at 316.
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of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. 8
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the lower
courts' dismissal of the case, finding that no admiralty jurisdiction existed in this particular case. It openly criticized a
"purely mechanical application" of the locality test, noting
that such an exclusive test of admiralty jurisdiction creates
special problems when aviation torts are concerned.2 9
Rather than focusing on where such a tort is committed,
the ExecutiveJet Court declared that the history of admiralty
law warranted a requirement that "the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity," and that the
absence of such relationship would cause the action to be
barred in admiralty.30 The Court also hinted that only by
legislative action could such a claim survive a jurisdictional
challenge.3 1
With the announcement of this new standard, prospective plaintiffs of aviation tort cases could no longer be certain of an admiralty option even if the tort occurred in
navigable waters. The main problem in interpreting the decision involved determining exactly what would constitute a
"traditional maritime activity." 32 The Court did give an example of an event that did not meet the requisite maritime
relationship - the instance in which a land-based plane
28

Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 251-52.

Id. at 261. In using the instant case as an example, the Court explained:
The case before us provides a good example of these difficulties. The
petitioners contend that since their aircraft crashed into the navigable
waters of Lake Erie and was totally destroyed when it sank in those
waters, the locality of the tort, or the place where the alleged negligence took effect, was there. The fact that the major damage to their
plane would not have occurred if it had not landed in the lake indicated, they say, that the substance and consummation of the wrong
took place in navigable waters. The respondents, on the other hand,
argue that the alleged negligence took effect when the plane collided
with the birds - over land.
Id. at 267. The Court avoided deciding whether either party had the more persuasive argument; its decision ultimately focused on the nature of the wrong rather
than its locality. Id. at 268.
- Id. (emphasis added).
31

Id.

32 Wiggins, supra note 9, at 192.
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crashed during a flight from one point in the continental
United States to another.3 3 In addition, the Court mentioned factors which it deemed relevant to the analysis, including the similarities between a downed plane and a
sinking ship, territorial versus international waters, and the
locality of the committed tort.34 The relative weight of such
factors were left for the lower court's discretion.
C.

INITIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE ExEcTVEfJET STANDARD

As would be expected, commentators and courts struggled to apply and analyze the ExecutiveJet standard. 5 In the
ten years following the Supreme Court opinion, different
courts chose different approaches in defining the "significant maritime relationship" required to find admiralty jurisdiction over aviation torts. Generally, the approaches can
be classified into three categories: a functional3 6 test, a "locality plus" standard, and an activity-based test.

1.

The FunctionalApproach

A functional test focuses on the function of the aircraft in
question, so that a maritime relationship is found if the aircraft is acting in a traditional maritime capacity.37 The
cause of a specific tort will therefore not be considered if
the functional test is used.
38
A 1973 Florida district court, in Teachey v. United States,

first chose to construe ExecutiveJet's test as functional rather
33 Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 271.

Id. at 264-66.
35 Note, Elaborate Casuistry: Admiralty JurisdictionAfter ExecutiveJet, 34 FED. Bus. J.
157 (1975); Note, Federal Courts - Admiralty Jurisdiction - "MaritimeLocality Plus
MaritimeNexus" Required to EstablishAdmiralty Jurisdictionin Aviation Negligence Cases Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rv. 1071
(1973); Note, Hops, Skips, andJumps Into Admiralty Revisited, 39J. AIaR L. & CoM. 625
(1973).
-% Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1975), discussed at part II.C.2., infra.
-7 See Wiggins, supra note 9, at 194, 206. An example of a traditional maritime
capacity could be the maritime nature of a "search and rescue" operation. Id. at
194.
363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
-4
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than causal, noting that the cause of aviation torts will "almost invariably [be] attributable to a cause unrelated to the
sea .

. . ."39

The facts in this case involved a Coast Guard

helicopter that crashed on land following a rescue of
shrimp fisherman from a sinking boat in the Gulf of Mexico. The plaintiff emphasized that the helicopter had been
acting in a capacity traditionally reserved for sea vessels.
The court agreed with the plaintiff's reasoning but not his
conclusion. In finding that no maritime relationship existed, the court focused on the fact that the crash occurred
after a refueling stop and subsequent to the Gulf rescue operation. Hence, any maritime connection ceased upon the
refueling stop.40 A court following the Teachey rationale
therefore looks to see if the accident occurred while performing an act which is functionally equivalent to the job of
a sea vessel.
This functional application found further supporters in
other jurisdictions, particularly the Fifth Circuit.4" For example, in Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters42 the appellate
court, in a per curiam decision, asserted that a helicopter
being "used in place of a vessel to ferry personnel to and
from offshore drilling structures, bears the type of significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" needed to
invoke admiralty laws.43 Unstated in the opinion, but implied by its result, was the corollary theory that helicopters
have more of a maritime relationship than planes, even
39

Id. at 1199.

Id.
See Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1974) (holding that "the functions and roles of the parties" are determinative factors in deciding whether admiralty rules would apply in a boating accident); Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), afl'd in part, 545 F.2d
422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that a helicopter fulfilled the maritime relationship requirement because it was ferrying passengers to an offshore oil rig, a duty ordinarily performed by a crewboat). See also
Miller v. Cousins Properties, 378 F. Supp. 711 (D.C. Vt. 1974) (holding that a passenger plane crash into navigable waters did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction because the function of the plane was to carry passengers between points within the
continental United States).
42 609 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
40

41

43

Id. at 824.
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though both may serve similar functions. This theory seems
reasonable if later cases involving similar oil-rig/helicopter
scenarios are examined. Thus, while a helicopter crashing
into the Gulf of Mexico may find remedies in admiralty,44 a
single-engine pleasure plane may not.45
2.

The "Locality Plus" Standard

The Ninth Circuit elected to apply a new two-prong analysis for admiralty jurisdiction in the 1974 case of Roberts v.
United States.46 The Roberts court examined an attempted

admiralty complaint over a cargo plane which crashed into
navigable waters 2000 feet from the runway at a United
States Air Base in Okinawa. While the Ninth Circuit could
conceivably have applied a simple functional test, the Roberts court constructed a test requiring navigable waters locality plus a maritime nexus requirement.47 Here, "geographic
realities," combined with the "transoceanic transportation
4
of cargo" warranted a finding of a valid maritime action. 1
The "plus" requirement altered the functional test by expanding maritime nexus criteria to include, in addition to
functional characteristics, "the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and the type of injury;
and the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law."4 9
Under "locality-plus," these characteristics must have a mar44 Id.
45 Hayden v. Krusling, 521 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Fla. 1982) (finding that the disap-

pearance of a land-based plane flying from New Orleans to Pensacola bore no significant relationship to a maritime activity, even though its last positions were plotted
more than fifty miles south of the northern Gulf of Mexico shoreline). Cf Mancuso
v. Kimex, 484 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980), (involving a claim arising out of the
crash of a Douglas DC6 cargo plane into the sea 300 feet short of a runway in Kingston, Jamaica). The Mancuso plaintiffs DOHSA cause of action survived a jurisdictional attack when the court deemed admiralty as a proper forum, finding that the
"requisite maritime status" existed where "the plane was being used in lieu of a vessel
to carry cargo from the United States to Jamaica." Id. Possibly, the Mancuso court
viewed cargo planes to foreign countries as being more "maritime" than passenger
planes flying over the Gulf. At any rate, it is interesting that the Hayden court later
chose to ignore Mancuso in denying a passenger plane admiralty jurisdiction.
46 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1975).
47 Id. at 523; see Wiggins, supra note 9.
48 Roberts, 498 F.2d at 524.
0 Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d at 525 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).

1994]

AVIATION TORTS IN ADMIRALTY

itime quality in addition to the event occurring in a maritime locality.
This definitional expansion, rather than creating a reliable standard, opened the door for a free-form test largely
dependent upon factual circumstances. For example, in
T.J. Falgout v. United States5 ° the Ninth Circuit held that a
suit involving an accidental discharge of a Navy Sidewinder
missile from a Navy airplane was cognizable in admiralty."'
Its rationale in that case rested upon the premise that Navy
operations were maritime operations per se, regardless of
whether aircraft or vessels were involved.52 Interestingly,
the Falgout court had chosen to focus on the Navy plane's
relationship to a maritime activity, rather than the plaintiffs ship, which was struck by the Sidewinder missile.
Nothing in the decision indicates why the plaintiffs ship
alone could not have satisfied the maritime relationship
requirement.
The "locality plus" standard has also been applied to find
admiralty jurisdiction over incidents involving seaplanes. In
the Virgin Islands, the problems faced by seaplanes in takeoffs and landings have been held sufficiently maritime in
nature to warrant jurisdiction under admiralty law.53
3.

The Activity-Based Test

Various district courts departed from the functional and
"locality plus" tests, concentrating instead on the "activity"
part of the "traditional maritime activity" referred to in Executive Jet.54 This more restrictive view seems to require an
obvious maritime connection, rather than a functional
equivalent. A Pennsylvania district court, in American Home
so 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
5' Id. Most military air/sea crash cases have little trouble meeting the tests for
admiralty jurisdiction. See Stoddard v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314
(C.D. Cal 1980) (holding that no right to a jury trial was available to defendants in a
case where an Air Force aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean).
52 508 F.2d at 857.
-3 Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977); Hark v. Antilles Airboats, 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973).
- 409 U.S. at 268.
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Assurance Co. v. United States,55 completely ignored the functional use of a plane ferrying passengers from Atlantic City,
New Jersey, to Block Island, New York. This court suggested that the Executive Jet court appeared to question
whether aviation accidents, under any circumstances, were
appropriate subjects of admiralty suits per se. 56 Hence,
although Block Island may only be accessed by air or sea,
the Pennsylvania court appeared to require an element of
substance over function in denying the plaintiffs an admiralty claim.
Exactly what would substantiate the Pennsylvania court's
definition of a "traditional maritime activity" is subject to
debate. The court clearly did not believe that aviation suits
belong in admiralty law. In a different jurisdiction, the results could have been quite different. It could be fairly easy
to justify admiralty in American Home via the functional test
by stating that transportation to Block Island traditionally
was accomplished by ferry.
In New York, a district court later applied a cursory "activity-based" test in a case in which a helicopter transporting
passengers to an oil rig crashed thirty miles from the Norwegian coastline." Paying no attention to the function of
the craft, nor to the foreign locality, the court merely stated
that "the accident that gave rise to this suit [was] probably
related closely enough to extensive offshore operations to
fall within the Court's admiralty jurisdiction." 59 Clearly, ExecutiveJet failed to define an appreciable jurisdictional standard for aviation torts.
The discussion thus far has covered the initial cases interpreting the ExecutiveJet standards and the three discernable
approaches that have been applied. In the early to mid1980s, however, the courts continued to wrestle with the
389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 658.
57 See, e.g., Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th
Cir. 1972) (noting in dicta that a ferry sinking into the Mississippi River would satisfy
requirements for admiralty jurisdiction).
58 Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
59 Id. at 496.
55
56
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problem, and the only constant has been their inconsistency. The next sections discuss more recent case law, issues involving the growing number of non-wrongful death
suits, and potential legislative reform.
III.

OIL AND WATER, AVIATION AND ADMIRALTY
THE CONTINUING FAILURE TO MIX

-

During the 1980s, judges still seemed willing to allow aviation suits within admiralty jurisdiction, despite suggestions
that courts limit such cases to situations where proposed
statutory rules could provide for admiralty.' These statutory proposals have continually failed to survive committee
challenges 1 and courts, reluctant to dismiss perfectly valid
claims upon jurisdictional grounds, have applied flexible
standards to spare claims from a quick judicial death. The
following sections highlight the more recent decisions affecting the way courts interpret admiralty law with respect
to aviation torts.
A.

SmjH

V PAN AIR AND THE RESULTING MESS

The Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to fully review the
first ten years following Executive Jet in Smith v. Pan Air
Corp.,6 2 a decision examining suits arising from two separate

aircraft crashes. In one claim, a widow sought damages in
admiralty from the employer of her deceased husband.
Her husband, a pilot who regularly flew passengers engaged in mineral exploration to and from Louisiana shores,
was killed when his seaplane crashed into Louisiana soil as
he returned from a river-based minerals operation. The
second claim concerned a helicopter used to transport oil
rig workers to and from platforms located in the Gulf of
Mexico. As the pilot took off from a rig platform, the helicopter collided with a nearby crane ball and crashed into
the Gulf, killing the pilot. The widows of both pilots
- See generally Brackin, supra note 4; Wiggins, supra note 9.
61 See discussion at part V, infra.
6,2684 F.2d 1102 (1982).
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brought appeals after the district courts dismissed both
suits for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit
consolidated the cases.
With respect to the first suit involving the seaplane crash,
the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of that
claim.63 The decisive factor appeared to be the fact that the
seaplane crashed into an inland Louisiana marsh rather
than navigable waters. 64 Disregarding both the functional
purpose of the seaplane and the relationship of the wrong
to a traditional maritime activity, the Smith court opined
that "maritime locality is still an indispensable element of
maritime jurisdiction" and ended its analysis on the seaplane accident at that point.65 Hence, Smith promulgates
locality as an indispensable part of admiralty jurisdiction.
The second set of facts in Smith, which involved both
wrongful death and property damage claims, survived the
admiralty jurisdiction test under the Fifth Circuit's reasoning.6 6 First, the fact that the wrongful death "occurred as a

result of an aircraft crash into the high seas [was] alone
enough to confer jurisdiction under the DOHSA. '' 67 Fur-

thermore, in examining the property damage claim, the
court chose explicitly to extend admiralty jurisdiction to
non-death claims originating on the high seas as long as the
flight had an "essential maritime nexus." 68 It reasoned that,
while such claims must always satisfy the "locality-plus" test,
a separate justification existed since 'judicial economy" occurs by litigating related claims in the same court. 69 Thus,
Smith v. Pan Air firmly established maritime locality as an
absolute prerequisite to the survival of an aviation tort
claim in an admiralty suit, at least within its own
jurisdiction.
63 Id. at 1108.
64

Id.

65

Id.

-

Id. at 1108-12.
Smith, 684 F.2d at 1111.
Id. at 1112.

69

Id.

67
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Nevertheless, this bright-line test remains confusing since
statutory grants confer admiralty jurisdiction over injuries
occurring on land. For example, the Jones Act extends admiralty jurisdiction to injuries suffered by crew members in
the course and scope of their employment, even if suffered
on land. 70 The emphasis on "maritime relationship" conceivably led plaintiffs, prior to the Smith decision, to believe
that locality's impact on the jurisdictional question had lessened in the years following Executive Jet.71 When considering that admiralty jurisdiction had earlier been granted in
cases involving seaplanes, 72 and that admiralty had been denied in the Gulf of Mexico plane crash cases, 73 the confusion becomes quite clear. Aviation tort plaintiffs,
confronted with. borderline fact situations, must roll the judicial dice if they wish to remain in admiralty law.
B.

THREE UNLUCKY ROLLS OF THE ADMIRALTY DICE

The jurisdictional dilemma was used to the federal government's advantage in Miller v. United States.74 In Miller,
two men flew from the Bahamas to Florida in a private
plane. Their plane crashed into international waters forty
miles from West Palm Beach. Relatives of the deceased
filed suit against the United States, seeking to hold the air
traffic controllers responsible for the deaths. They based
their claims upon the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).7
The United States sought to have the suit dismissed on
grounds that the claims should have been filed under the
70 See id. at 1107 n.12 (citing O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36 (1943)); see also Vincent v. Harvey Well Serv., 441 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
The Jones Act, passed in 1920, applies to seamen injured in the course of their
performance and allows them to recover damages against their employers. 46
U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988). The first widow in Smith attempted to bring claims under
both the Jones Act and general admiralty law. Her Jones Act argument failed because the court believed that the seaplane pilot was not a "seaman" within the meaning of the Act. Smith, 684 F.2d at 1112.
71 See supra note 54.
72 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
74 725 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.), (involving negligent air traffic controllers), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
75 28 U.S.C. app. § 1346 (1988).
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Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) 76 rather than the FTCA. The
suit would then have to be dismissed because of the SAA's
shorter statute of limitations. 77 The Eleventh Circuit questioned whether the "land based negligence" of the air traffic controllers, which resulted in an airplane crash into the
high seas, was within admiralty jurisdiction. 78
Citing the Roberts case as support, the Eleventh Circuit
disregarded the locality of the negligence and held the locality of the actual accident was determinative. 79 In addition, the function of the plane significantly influenced the
Miller holding "because the trip between the Bahamas and
the United States has traditionally been accomplished by
ship, and would, of necessity, have to be accomplished by
ship but for the introduction of the airplane into this forum." 80 The relatives of the deceased in Miller consequently
lost their cause of action against the United States.81
The plaintiffs in City of New York v. Waterfront Airways 2
also lost the battle in an attempted admiralty suit against
the private owners of a New Jersey commuter floatplane,
Waterfront Airways. In this case the plaintiffs, rather than
the defendants, pled jurisdiction within admiralty. The
floatplane, during a flight between Wall Street and New
Jersey, collided with a traffic patrol helicopter and crashed
into New York Harbor. The pilot and one passenger died
in the accident, but two other passengers survived. Since
both passengers and Waterfront Airways were New Jersey
residents, no diversity existed and federal jurisdiction had
to be predicated upon admiralty."'
76 46 U.S.C. app. § 741 (1988).
77 The Suits in Admiralty Act applies to maritime suits against the United States.

Id. The longer statute of limitations for maritime torts still applies to private vessel

owners. See supra note 17.
78

Miller, 725 F.2d at 1312.

Id. at 1315 (citing Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1975)). For a discussion of Roberts see supra notes 46-48 and
accompanying text.
7-

80 Miller, 725 F.2d at 1312.
81

Id.

620 F. Supp. 411 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). Waterfront's factual setting provided the basis
for the Introduction to this comment.
82

s3 Id. at 412.
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The New York district court did not appear concerned
with the locality portion of its two-pronged "locality plus"
test; the court actually proceeded under the assumption
that a maritime locale existed, though the court acknowledged even that assumption was subject to debate.84
Rather, the "traditional maritime activity" standard killed
the cause of action: "The mere fact that a plane is a floatplane and thus equipped to make takeoffs and landings in
water is insufficient, in and of itself, to be grounds for finding the existence of admiralty jurisdiction."85
The Waterfront court further rejected the plaintiff's attempts to cite prior cases where seaplane accidents properly
fell within admiralty. It distinguished Hark v. Antilles
AirboatS?6 from the Waterfront scenario by explaining that
the former case based its decision upon the navigational
similarities faced by pilots of floatplanes during takeoffs
and landings, and by pilots of other water vessels.87 Under
the Waterfront court's reasoning, Antilles could not apply because the crash in Waterfront occurred after takeoff and
prior to its landing. 8 In addition, the lack of the international waters locale, present in Antilles, also swayed the New
York court's decision (despite its assumption, for the sake
of legal analysis, that the required locality was present).89
Finally, the plaintiffs appeal to a functional test fell upon
deaf ears. The plaintiff cited the case of Higginbotham v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 90 which found admiralty jurisdiction proper
in an accident involving a floatplane transporting oil workers to an oil rig. The Waterfront court again distinguished
the cited case, noting that the decisive factor in Higginbotham was that only ships or planes could access the oil rigs. 1
-

Id. at 414.

8

Id.

86 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973), discussed supra note 53.
87 Waterfront, 620 F. Supp. at 414.
88

Id.

89

Id.

- 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd in part,545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (discussed supra note 41).
91 Waterfront, 620 F. Supp. at 415.
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Thus, Higginbotham could not be applied to the Waterfront
case because water and air travel were not the "exclusive
92
means of access" between New York and New Jersey.
All of the Waterfront reasonings can be criticized. First, in
its Hark application, the court asserts that floatplanes may
be admiralty subjects when taking off or landing, but not
when actually in the air. 93 This construction leaves jurisdiction open to entirely fortuitous circumstances. Second, its
complaint of the lack of an international waters locale disregards other possible exercises of admiralty jurisdiction over
accidents occurring within domestic navigable waters. 4
Nor does the argument requiring water or air as the exclusive means of transport provide a better standard for predicting admiralty. 95 The lack of a reliable gauge
undoubtedly confuses litigants in their choice of forums.
Another example of parties penalized by the very factspecific approach in the court's jurisdictional analysis occurs in Brons v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,96 where a district court
denied admiralty to a plane that crashed more than four
nautical miles beyond the Florida shoreline. 97 The persons
on the plane, a flight instructor and his student, were both
killed, and their relatives filed a suit under the Florida
Wrongful Death Act.98 The defendant sought summary
judgment, claiming that DOHSA provided the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Finding that admiralty jurisdiction did not
Id.
91 Id. at 414. "In the instant case, the collision occurred after the Floatplane was
airborne, and prior to its descent for landing, thus the navigational concerns associated with takeoffs and landings in water are simply not present." Id.
94 The definition of navigable waters within the context of an admiralty action
includes domestic navigable waters. See supra note 23.
95 See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 657
92

(M.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that a charter to a New York island, accessible only by sea
or air, did not bear sufficient relationship to maritime activities to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction), see supra notes 55-57 for the initial discussion of this case.
96 627 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
97 Id. at 231 n.1. The crash thus occurred well beyond the one marine league
requirement needed to satisfy the statutory DOHSA requirement. Id. A marine
league equals one-twentieth part of a degree of latitude, or three geographical or
nautical miles. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 967 (6th ed. 1990).
98 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.16-.27 (West 1986).
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apply in this case, the Brons court denied the defendant's
motion and allowed the plaintiff to maintain an action
under the Florida statute. 99
In Brons the court addressed one area of confusion whether Executive jet requirements must still be satisfied in a
DOHSA action.100 Brons ruled that even DOHSA required a
relationship to a traditional maritime activity. 101 Apparently, the Brons court reached this conclusion because the
Miller court applied an ExecutiveJet test to find admiralty juthe accident occurred forty miles
risdiction even though
1 02
southeast of Florida.
The court then found that the Brons accident had no relationship to a traditional maritime activity, since its purpose was merely flight instruction, and the destinations
were entirely within Florida:103 "The location of the accident was totally fortuitous."104 By requiring the maritime
nexus, the Brons court removed the plaintiff's claim from
the defendthe exclusive provisions of DOHSA,10denying
5
ant's motion for summary judgment.
Finally, Duplantis v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc."° ' illustrates
the confusion surrounding aviation in an admiralty context
more than twenty years after Exectuive Jet. The Duplantis
plaintiff sought a Motion to Remand their case, which was
Brons, 627 F. Supp. at 233.
Id. at 232. The text of the statute is provided supra note 6. Prior to Brons, cases
were unclear as to whether a maritime nexus would still be required in a DOHSA
action. Indeed, one commentator believed that the Executive Jet standards and
DOHSA were mutually exclusive, so that the nexus requirements would. not apply to
accidents beyond territorial waters. Moris Davidovitz, Aviation Deaths on the Seas: The
Flight into Maritime Law, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 57,66-67 (1986) ("[T]he
[Executive Jet] test should apply solely to aviation accidents that occur on a state's
territorial waters within the marine league boundary."). Mr. Davidovitz cited Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986), as support (discussed infra at notes
108-116). Neither the Supreme Court nor Mr. Davidovitz attempted to reconcile
this interpretation with the district court decision.
10, 627 F. Supp. at 252 (citing Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)).
00

100

1 2 Id. at 232-33.
103

Id.

104

Id.

105 Id.

100 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12855 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 1993).
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previously removed by the defendant to a federal court.
The litigation arose out of a helicopter crash in a marsh
within the territorial limits of Louisiana. Seeking remand
of the case back to a state court, the plaintiffs argued that a
federal court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The Louisiana district court agreed, ignoring any functional use of
the helicopter, and stated that because the marshy areas involved were not "navigable in fact," the case did not satisfy
the requirements for admiralty jurisdiction. 107
By 1983, the status of aviation torts within the realm of
admiralty appeared posed for a crash landing. By requiring
the satisfaction of the Executive Jet standards in aircraft tort
cases, even when the statutory provisions of DOHSA are
otherwise satisfied, the courts ensured continuing confusion more than two decades after the supposedly landmark
decision. The difficulty of asserting admiralty in aviation
cases was clear, yet the courts still refused to close the door
entirely. Confusing jurisdictional standards, however,
would not be the sole problem when considering whether
aviation torts belong in admiralty. The next section highlights recent issues that complicate the litigant's choice of
forum.
IV.

HARDLY A UNIFORM CASELAW STANDARD:
ADMIRALTY'S INEFFECTIVENESS IN
HANDLING AVIATION TORTS

While the Executive Jet test remains muddled twenty years
after its inception, most recent cases involving aviation torts
have examined issues arising from admiralty's incompatibility with aviation even if the jurisdictional requirements are
met. The next four cases have all been allowed in federal
courts on the basis of a sufficient maritime nexus, but for
various reasons the litigants have been penalized as a result
of admiralty's failure to deal with specialized problems in
aviation.
-07

Id. at *3.
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AND STATE LAW PREEMPTION

The United States Supreme Court addressed the ubiquitous helicopter/oil-rig crash scenario in Offshore Logistics v.
Tallentire.108 The facts here concerned a helicopter that
crashed thirty-five miles south of the Louisiana coastline,
killing respondent Tallentire's husband and one other passenger. The Supreme Court found jurisdiction over the
case via DOHSA since the deaths occurred more than one
marine league from shore. 109
For the most part, jurisdiction based upon DOHSA will
be desirable from the plaintiff's perspective because the
statute: (1) establishes a three-year statute of limitations,
(2) allows continuance of suits filed by victims who die
prior to the end of the suit, and (3) prevents contributory
negligence from barring recovery." 0 The statute, however,
limits recovery to "fair and just compensation for... pecuniary loss.""' In Offshore Logistics the respondent/plaintiff
sought, in addition to the DOHSA pecuniary damages, nonpecuniary damages for loss of consortium, service, and society, as permitted under the Louisiana statutes then in
effect." 2 The Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that
108 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
1-0
Id. at 218. A textual argument can be advanced concluding that the Offshore
Logistics Court chose not to follow the Brons argument (see supra notes 96-105 and
accompanying text), which required satisfaction of the ExecutiveJet test in addition to
the DOHSA locality requirement. The Court states: "Even without [DOHSA], admiralty jurisdiction is appropriately invoked here under traditional principles because
the accident occurred on the high seas and in furtherance of an activity bearing a
significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity." Id. at 218-19. This seemingly indicates that under the Supreme Court's interpretation, only satisfaction of
DOHSA will be needed for admiralty to be invoked. See also supra note 101.
110 Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 215 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 763a, 765, and 766
(1988)).
1 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988).
112 LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. art. 2315(B) (West Supp. 1986). The Louisiana statutes,
if applicable, would have been applied in federal court via the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCLSA). OCLSA generally provides for federal jurisdiction over
accidents on "the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial
islands and fixed structures" upon the Shelf. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (A) (1988).
While federal jurisdiction controls, the adjacent state law is adopted to the extent
that it is not inconsistent with federal law. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 210. Hence,
the Offshore Logistics respondent had to contend with three possible jurisdictional
doorways. The Supreme Court eventually ruled that the since the accident did not
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DOHSA provided an exclusive remedy for death on the
high seas, dismissing the respondent's claim for damages
under the Louisiana statute. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
lower court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a decision relevant to any potential plaintiffs seeking
federal jurisdiction under DOHSA, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit holding and ruled that DOHSA, if
applicable, would effectively preempt state wrongful death
statutes.' 3 While an extensive analysis of the Offshore Logistics reasoning in reaching this conclusion is beyond the
scope of this comment," 4 the Court essentially rationalized
that "where Congress has spoken, or where general federal
maritime law controlled, the States exercising concurrent
jurisdiction over maritime matters could not apply conflict5
ing state substantive law.""
While the Supreme Court's decision concededly "prevents disunity in the provision of forums to survivors of
those killed on the high seas,"" 6 the advantages of the preemption rules are reduced in cases involving borderline admiralty/aviation torts. The difficulty in predicting whether
or not admiralty, and hence DOHSA, applies has been
demonstrated in the prior sections. Consequently, a bad
guess regarding the way a court views such a case creates a
double-edged sword - it can trigger dismissal of a claim in
federal court if not cognizable in admiralty, or can cut off
state remedies if allowed as a maritime claim. This uncertainty undermines the litigant's ability to choose the most
beneficial forum for his claim, or even predict whether a
claim will be allowed at all. The confusion then begs the
question of whether DOHSA, enacted in 1920, should be

occur on the platform, OCLSA did not apply and DOHSA provided the sole means
of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 219-20.
Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 219-20.
A more in-depth analysis of Offshore Logistics can be found in Zachary W. Allen,
Casenote, 53J. AIR L. & COM. 261 (1987).
- Id. at 288.
116 Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 232.
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an appropriate provision for modern aviation problems at
n7
all."
B.

THE PROBLEM OF NONINJURY, NONDEATH CLAIMS

Yet another complexity confounding the admiralty-aviation dilemma arose in Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft."8 This case demonstrated the risk that a court
could bifurcate noninjury, nondeath claims in accordance
to varying maritime relationships. In Sikorsky an insurer of a
helicopter buyer sued the seller and manufacturer on theories of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict products
liability. The buyer, a Brazilian corporation, had purchased
a fleet of helicopters from Sikorsky. One of the helicopters
crashed off the coast of Brazil, killing fourteen people on
board. The insurer of the buyer sought to recover all costs
of the lost vehicle. In moving for summary judgment, one
of the defendant's arguments included ajurisdictional challenge."' According to the defendant, admiralty jurisdiction did not recognize negligence and products liability
claims.120

In response, the Comind court cited a recent Supreme
Court case that determined when products liability suits
should apply to admiralty law. The court identified three
possible scenarios where liability could be imposed. The
first situation involves a defective product that malfunctions

and causes personal injury to the user or third party. A second case could arise if a defective product malfunctions

and almost causes injury (the "near miss" scenario). The
third case occurs if the defective product malfunctions, but
- The question becomes more compelling as litigation extends beyond the air
and into space. Davidovitz, supra note 100, at 95 ("[Because a good argument can
be made that the vestiges of admiralty jurisdiction no longer logically apply to aviation deaths even though they occur on the high seas, the application of these principle to deaths that occur in space becomes even more tenuous.").
118 116 F.R.D. 397 (D. Conn. 1987).
119 Id. at 416.
12 Id. Admiralty jurisdiction applied to this case under a "locality plus" test the usual result in helicopter crash cases occurring over the high seas. Id.
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fails to threaten parties with physical injury (the "disappointed but unharmed" scenario).12 t
The court then stated that negligence and products liability in admiralty could only be asserted in the first scenario. 122 Since deaths did occur in the facts of Sikorsky, the
court allowed the insurer's claims to remain within admiralty's jurisdiction. 2 3 The court also chose to avoid the defendant's alternative argument that the helicopter sales
agreement's24 warranty disclaimer barred recovery in
admiralty.1
Economic losses within aviation suits were again an issue
in Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp.,' 25 where
the plaintiff alleged that a helicopter was unreasonably dangerous and defective. The helicopter had crashed into the
Jokulfirdir fjords of northwest Iceland, and all four crew
members drowned. Evidence showed that the helicopter's
emergency flotation gear failed to deploy, and the sliding
door's track mechanism jammed, trapping the crew members in the vehicle. In the resulting lawsuit, the Connecticut district court invoked admiralty jurisdiction by the
26
"locality plus" test.
The defendant contended that a products liability claim
could not exist in admiralty where a commercial party
claimed solely a commercial economic lOSS. 1 27 Apparently,
the United Technologies court agreed with the defendant, because it dismissed the plaintiffs claims for replacement of
the aircraft, recovery of the wreck, loss of use of the aircraft,
and training of replacement flight crews. 2 The court allowed claims related to the search for the helicopter's crew,
121 Id. at 416 (citing East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 865 (1986)).
122

Id.

12

Id. at 417.

124
125

Id.
722 F. Supp. 942 (D. Conn. 1989).

126 Id. at 945-46. The Icelandic locality satisfied the first prong, and the adaption
of the helicopter for marine rescue passed the second part. Id.
127 Id. at 947 (citing East River Steamship, 476 U.S. 858 (1986)).
128 Id. at 948. The court said "[t]he mere existence of separate claims for wrongful death does not make those claims for commercial economic loss cognizable in
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however, since they
were "inextricably tied" to the personal
129
injuries incurred.

In addition, a recent Colorado case examined an attempted admiralty suit alleging damages for mental distress. Morgan v. United Air Lines 3 involved a commercial
airline flight between Honolulu and New Zealand. Shortly
after takeoff from Honolulu, a cargo door and part of the
fuselage of the plane separated due to decompression at
23,000 feet above sea level. Five seats (fortunately vacant)
in the business section fell out of the plane when the fuseallage separated. The plaintiffs, passengers on the flight,
1 31
experience.
the
from
stemming
distress
mental
leged
The Morgan court felt the instant case did not belong in
admiralty since the "alleged wrong [did] not bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."' 3 2 The

rationale was that since no cause of action for the infliction
of emotional distress existed under traditional maritime
law, state law should govern.'13 This conclusion, reached
despite a transoceanic locale and destinations separated by
sea, seemingly asserts a third prong to the traditional Executive Jet test. Apparently under Morgan, a claim otherwise
cognizable in admiralty will fail unless the claim involves a
tort previously
recognized under "traditional maritime
4
law."

3

More recently, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the inconsistency in remedies allowed under admiralty law in Nichols
v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.13 5 Nichols involved a longshoreman's suit for loss of consortium, allegedly caused by injuries sustained in a helicopter accident which occurred
eighty miles off the Louisiana coast. Citing three U.S.
admiralty, and summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for purely commercial economic losses therefore is appropriate." Id.
"9 Id.
-3 750 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Colo. 1990).
is,Id. at 1048.
132 Id. at 1054.

133Id.
154 Id.

,-517 F.3d 119 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Supreme Court decisions,1 36 the Fifth Circuit construed the
opinions as allowing recovery for loss of consortium when
the injuries occur to longshoremen in territorial waters, but
disallowing such damages when the accident occurs outside
territorial waters (due to the pecuniary loss restriction
under DOHSA) .13 Somewhat reluctantly, the Fifth Circuit
followed the disparate treatment of longshoremen within
and without territorial boundaries, "[u] ntil such time as the
138
Supreme Court resolves this inconsistency.
The segmentation of claims discussed in this section
highlights the inefficiency of litigating aviation torts in admiralty. Even if the initial action should survive the jurisdictional challenge, success in the admiralty forum still
depends on a multitude of independent factors, including
the legal theories of the suit,' 39 whether or not personal injuries were involved, 40 and whether the laws of admiralty
had previously recognized the tort involved.' 4 1 Perhaps the
only safe conclusion that can be drawn from this trend is
that air and water simply do not mix. Since aviation tort
cases increasingly find it difficult to maintain suits in admiralty, the better solution may be to provide an absolute cutoff from maritime law when any aviation nexus is involved.
V. THE STATUTORY SOLUTION
A statutory scheme vesting jurisdiction over aviation accidents within federal courts has, over the years, earned the
support of a vocal minority of legislators. Perhaps the most
ardent of supporters was former Senator Joseph D. Tydings
of Maryland, who chaired the Subcommittee of Improvements for Judicial Machinery during the second session of
- Sea Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19

(1990).
137

Nichols, 17 F.3d at 123.

1,8 Id.

140
141

See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
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the 90th Congress in the late 1960s. 142 According to Senator Tydings, the confusing array of conflicting state laws
generates further confusion when a major aircraft disaster
is involved. Senator Tydings reasoned:
Most often these suits are filed in the Federal courts on the
basis of diversity of citizenship of the parties.... Because of
the lack of adequate procedural devices and because these
suits may involve the conflicting laws of a number of different States, such combined trials are currently very difficult,
if not impossible. The result is a considerable waste ofjudicial time, an increase in the expense of litigation, and a conpersons who
siderable delay in the rendering of justice14to
3
are frequently badly in need of assistance.
With these arguments in hand, Senator Tydings proposed a
series of bills so broad in scope, so far-reaching in their potential to affect the aviation industry, that they were ultimately destined to fail. The next sections examine the
Tydings proposals and also more recent general aviation
bills, all of which affect the jurisdictional dilemma of aviation torts.
A.

THE TYDINGS PROPOSALS

In April 1968, Senator Tydings proposed Senate Bill
3305, which would have established exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil damage actions resulting from the operation of aircraft in interstate or foreign commerce.14 4 A
second bill, Senate Bill 3306, accompanied the first bill and
advanced a much broader spectrum of instances for the
federal court's exclusive control. 1 45 Both bills, which dif112 John T. McDermott, Federal Jud. Center Staff Paper, in AIR DISASTER LITIGATION: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 3

(1977).

114 CONG. REc. 9435 (1968) (statements of Sen. Tydings).
144 S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 114 CONG. REc. 9436 (1968).
145 S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 114 CONG. REc. 9436 (1968).
'43

§ 1363(a) of the proposed Senate Bill provided that:
The district courts... shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States and of all other courts and exclusive of any admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction, of any action for damages for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death claimed to be caused by negligent, tortious or wrongful act of [sic] omission arising out of, or in the
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fered only in details, purported to "make the Federal courts
efficient instruments for rapidly dispensing
justice" in cases
46
arising out of aircraft accidents.
Senate Bill 3306 allowed for exclusive federal jurisdiction
over aviation actions for injury or death caused by negligence or other tortious conduct. 147 In contrast, Senate Bill
3305 provided for such exclusive jurisdiction over civil damages arising solely out of "interstate or foreign commerce." 148 Although the reach of the two bills appears
different, both proposed statutes could have provided a
quick solution to many of the problems raised by the cases
cited earlier in this comment. This is further supported by
the fact that both bills attempted to establish a uniform
body of federal substantive law that would apply to aviation
activities. 149 Such a provision could greatly alleviate the uncertainty and unfairness that can arise if admiralty laws conflict with other federal substantive laws.
A good example of how the Tydings proposals could have
affected the cases discussed can be seen by applying the
proposals to Miller v. United States. 0 The issue in Millerinvolved the government's assertion of admiralty jurisdiction
course of, aviation activity or space activity, as defined in chapter 175
of this title.
Id. (emphasis added). Chapter 175 of the proposed bill defined "aviation activity" as
any flight, takeoff, or landing over all places on earth, "whether by land or sea, including foreign countries." 114 CONG. REC. 9437 (1968). The provisions here are
broader than those of S. 3305, which imposes exclusive jurisdiction over only "civil
damage actions arising out of the operation of aircraft in interstate or foreign commerce." 114 CONG. REc. 9435 (1968). Hence, under the Tydings proposals, locality
would no longer have any relevance in cases involving aviation torts.
146 114 CONG. REC. 9435 (1968) (statements of Sen. Tydings).
147S. 3306, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
148 S. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Section 1407(a) (2) of S. 3305 defined
"interstate commerce" as commerce between different states and excluded commerce between sites in the same state unless the aircraft traveled "through the airspace over any place outside thereof." 114 CONG. REc. 9436 (1968).
149 114 CONG. Rc. 9435 (1968) (statements of Sen. Tydings). Section 2742 of
Senate Bill 3306 created a "uniform body of Federal law governing all civil legal
relations.., arising out of, or in the course of, aviation activity or space activity. Said
body of law is exclusive of the laws and rules of law of the several States... and the
admiralty or maritime law heretofore applicable." 114 CONG. REc. 9437 (1968).
1- 725 F.2d 1311, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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over a plane crash in international waters just outside of
Florida. The government's successful claim caused the
Eleventh Circuit to apply a shorter statute of limitations
under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) rather than a longer
one under the plaintiff's original FTCA claim. 151 Under the
proposed Senate Bill 3305 or Senate Bill 3306, which would
govern all such aircraft incidents, the plaintiffs claim would
never have faced such an unlikely procedural danger because a substantive Federal aviation law would automatically
52
preempt the SAA statute of limitations.
With respect to City of New York v. Waterfront Airways,
Inc.,153 either Senate Bill 3305 or Senate Bill 3306 would
have allowed federal jurisdiction since the floatplane
crashed during a trip between New Jersey and New York.
Both Tydings proposals would not have addressed whether
the floatplane bore a "maritime nexus" since the interstate
travel of the plane would suffice for the bill to apply. The
problems advanced in Waterfront - disputes involving locality, maritime activity, and functional purposes - would
consequently have been rendered moot. Thus, much judicial time and expense would have been saved, enabling the
parties to focus on the real questions of fault and compensation in a highly-publicized aircraft disaster.
Finally, application of the Tydings proposals would have
54
quickly solved the outcome of Brons v. Beech Aircraft Corp.1
The dispute in Brons centered on whether or not a Florida
wrongful death statue would control over a DOHSA remedy
in a case where the plaintiff's decedent crashed in a plane
several miles south of the Florida shoreline. Obviously, the
Tydings proposals would have eliminated such a conflict via
exclusive substantive aviation laws.' 55 The problems involv-

'1
152

153
154

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77.
620 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
627 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Fla. 1985); see supra notes 96-105 and accompanying

text.
5- See supra note 77.
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ing bifurcation of economic losses would similarly be
solved. 156
Despite the potential of the Tydings bills, the 90th Congress failed to act upon either proposal. 57 Senator Tydings
nevertheless introduced a third version of his proposals in
September of 1968, modified by suggestions from the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery.158 The reluctance of legislators to agree to a judicial
change as broad as those contemplated by Senate Bill 3306
was reflected by the narrower jurisdictional scope provided
by Senator Tyding's third version. Senate Bill 4089
"limit[ed] the availability of exclusive Federal jurisdiction to
those aircraft crashes which ordinarily involve substantial
numbers of people and multiple courts.'

59

Hence, the spe-

cific provisions of the revised bill vested exclusive federal
jurisdiction over actions resulting from operation of common carriers, planes with seating capacities over ten passengers, accidents injuring more than five passengers, and all
space activity.160 Another relevant modification provided
that a uniform law of aviation would be established, but
would be effective only to the extent that it did not conflict
with other federal law.' 6 1 In addition, Tydings inserted a
new passage explicitly reserving to the states the right of
jurisdiction over criminal cases and those involving economic regulation of commerce that is "wholly intrastate.' 62
Despite the modifications, the 90th Congress closed without passing any of Tyding's bills. 163 Legislation on aviation
jurisdiction following the Tydings proposals were few, and

See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
McDermott, supra note 142, at 14.
518
S. 4089, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 114 CONG. REc. 28616-19 (1968).
159 114 CONG. REc. 28616 (1968) (statement of Sen. Tydings).
-6 S. 4089, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1363(a) (1968).
161 Id. § 2751(a).
162 Id. § 2751(b).
165 Senator Tydings introduced a fourth version of his bills in 1969. S. 961, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). This bill, substantially similar to S. 4089, failed to pass as
well.
156
157
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those proposed called for only concurrent, rather
than ex16 4
clusive, federal jurisdiction over aviation torts.
B.

THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDY

In 1977 the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) published, at
the request of a Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction, a study which ultimately recommended
both exclusive Federal jurisdiction over major air disasters
165
and a uniform body of substantive federal aviation law.
Among the study's contributors was the late Judge Pierson
M. Hall, then serving the U.S. Central District of California.
Senator Tydings, in his statements before the legislature in
support of his 1960s proposals, credited Judge
Hall with the
1 66
general concepts behind the Tydings bills.
Although the study mainly addressed the problem of
multiparty, multidistrict litigation1 67 - a problem outside
6
A seemingly half-hearted attempt to reintroduce the jurisdictional aspect of
the Tydings proposals materialized in 1973 with S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (May
23, 1973), which provided a statutory basis for including aircraft accidents within
admiralty jurisdiction. Section 1316 of the bill would modify the still-effective 28
U.S.C. § 1333, cited supra note 12, to include for the purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction,
any claim arising out of an aircraft accident occurring on or over the
high seas or other navigable waters beyond a marine league from the
shore of any State or the territories ... but such jurisdiction shall not
include ... any claim solely because it arose on or over navigable waters of the United States.
S. 1876, § 1316(a) (3). The bill never left the Judiciary Committee, presumably since
the proposed modifications did little more than codify the case law discussed earlier
in this comment.
165 McDermott, supra note 142. Professor McDermott teaches at Loyola University School of Law, Los Angeles. His extensive background in the field of aviation
law led the Ninth Circuit to ask for his help in studying the problems addressed by
the Subcommittee.
1
114 CONG. REc. 9435 (1968); 114 CONG. REc. 28615 (1968). The author of
the FJC study notes that Judge Hall "has unquestionably handled far more aviation
litigation than any other federal or state judge and has been instrumental in getting
the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial Conference to consider [the aviation
litigation] problem." McDermott, supra note 142, at 5 n.12.
167 A fact emphasized by the FJC study's focus on aircraft disasters involving hundreds of deaths, generating hundreds of suits across dozens of foreign countries.
McDermott, supra note 142, at 6-7 (discussing In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732
(C.D. Cal. 1975)). Since such catastrophes undoubtedly entail federal jurisdiction,
they will not be discussed in this comment. For an in-depth examination of the
multiparty, multidistrict dilemma, see Brackin, supra note 4.
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the scope of this comment's jurisdictional focus, the conclusions from the study are certainly relevant to the admiralty/
aviation topic. The contributors to the study agreed that a
uniform body of substantive law should be applied to aviation cases, or at least to those originating from the same
accident. 16 Most importantly, the study analyzed the possi-

ble reasons behind the failure of the Tydings proposals with
respect to the jurisdictional questions. The study found
that although the Tydings bills found support within the
federal judiciary, the major opponents, not surprisingly,
came from the plaintiff's bar.169 These plaintiffs' attorneys
opposed exclusive federal jurisdiction over aviation torts for
several reasons. First, they stated that plaintiffs would lose
more cases in federal courts than in state courts. 170 Second,
some expressed concern that transfer and consolidation in
a single court would cause delay and additional costs.'

71

Fi-

nally, many plaintiffs' attorneys, as a general rule, favored
an arena in which they could "forum-shop." 172 The "plain-

tiff's bar" never had to further substantiate its arguments,
73
since the Tydings bills, as noted earlier, failed to pass.
Nevertheless, the FJC study found exclusive federal jurisdiction so crucial to the development of uniform substantive aviation law, that the contributors suggested that a bill
be drafted dealing solely with procedural and jurisdictional
matters.17 4 In this manner, disputes between the judiciary
and private interests of the sort that killed the Tydings proposals could be restricted to procedural rather than sub- McDermott, supra note 142, at 19.
o Id. at 15-16 (citing Hearings on S. 3305 and S. 3306 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 62-72, 80-89, 131, 176
(1968)) (citations omitted).
170

Id.

171 Id.

Id.
The plaintiffis bar has similarly opposed recent modifications to existing aviation law. For example, trial lawyers vigorously opposed the passage of Montreal Protocol 3, an attempt to raise the $75,000 liability limit imposed by the Warsaw
Convention. Eloise Cotugno, Comment, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintffs From
Either Courts or Legislature - Montreal Protocol 3 Drowns in Committee, 58 J. Aa L. &
COM. 745, 790-91 (1993).
174 McDermott, supra note 142, at 20.
172

173
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stantive provisions, thereby increasing chances of reaching
an agreement on at least those concepts.1 75 One possible
manifestation of such a restricted bill had been proposed
by Judge Hall in a speech delivered to the Federal Bar Association in September of 1974.176 The proposal takes sections of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)177 and
creating a separate statutory scheme for aviaalters them,
1 78
torts.
tion
C.

THE STATUTORY PROPOSALS -

REVITALIZATION IN THE

1990s?
In the decade or so following the FJC study, most of the
activity involving the aviation jurisdictional debate took
place within the judiciary rather than the legislature. The
majority of commentators focused on the decisions interpreting Executive Jet 17 9 and no mention was ever made of
either the Tydings bills or the FJC study.18 0 Possibly the retirements of Senator Tydings and the late Judge Hall, two
of the aviation industry's most formidable experts, bore
Id.
The Honorable Pierson M. Hall, Remarks Delivered to the Federal Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 6, 1974), in McDermott, App. A.
177 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988). See supra discussion at note 6 and accompanying
text.
178 Judge Hall suggested the following statute governing jurisdiction for aviation
torts. The statute borrows portions from the Death on High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 761 (1988).
49 U.S.C. § 1433. Right of action; where and by whom brought.
Whenever the death or injury of a person or loss of injury to any property shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring in
'air commerce" or within the "special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States" as defined by § 101 of this Act as amended (49 U.S.C.
1301, et seq.) the injured party as to such loss of or injury to property
and the personal representative of the decedent as to such death may
maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States,
for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent,
child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued.
According to Judge Hall, this fictitious statute could serve as a cornerstone for a
uniform system of federal aviation law. Hall, supra note 176.
179 See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
-80 The exception is the Brackin student comment cited supra note 4. Mr. Brackin originally proposed the reintroduction of the Tydings bills in toto, and the author of this comment hopes to "flesh out" his original proposition in more detail.
175

176
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some responsibility for the lapse in activity on the legislative
front. The unpredictability and uncertainty in the courts,
however, serve as a lengthy testimony to the continuing
need for uniformity within aviation law.
When major aviation legislation directed towards uniformity eventually did return to the Congressional floor, it
owed its reemergence not to a forward-thinking Senator or
judge concerned with aviation's future legal instability, but
rather to the nation's aviation industry and insurance carriers, focused on the bottom line. Between 1978 and 1985,
the skyrocketing increase in accident liability costs drove
many aircraft manufacturers out of business, and forced
others to resort to excess liability policies burdened with
massive deductibles.""1 Consequently, in 1986 a series of
Senate and House bills were introduced, all calling for uniform rules of liability for personal injury and 8property
dam2
accidents.
aviation
general
of
out
age arising
House Resolutions 4142,183 4717,184 and Senate Bill
2794185 addressed, to varying extents, three aspects of tort
law that had caused the most problems to general aviation
manufacturers. 6 House Resolution 4142, for example,
18, See Gregory P. Wells, Comment, General Aviation Accident Liability Standards:
Why the Fuss?,56J. AIR L. & COM. 895 (1991). In his 1986 remarks before the House
in support of aviation legislation, Bill Nelson of Florida noted that the "iability of
the [aviation] industry is tenuous due to sizable and unpredictable court judgments
and settlements that are currently facing aircraft manufacturers. In some cases, insurance premiums alone now exceed labor costs .. " 132 CONG. REC. E2998 (daily
ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Nelson).
182 The legislators have statutorily defined "general aviation aircraft" to mean
powered aircraft with a seating capacity of less than twenty passengers and not currently engaged in scheduled passenger carrying operations. Kassebaum Amendment No. 1823, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 203 (1986). Since most of the cases discussed
in this comment involved small aircraft being used for purposes other than passenger transport, the proposals could conceivably affect the decisions of similar cases in
the future.
183 H.R. 4142, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Rep. Glickman on Feb.
6, 1986).
184 H.R. 4717, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Rep. Hammerschmidt
on Apr. 30, 1986).
18- S. 2794, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Sen. Danforth on Sept. 3,
1986).
186 132 CONG. REc. H8347 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986)(statement of Rep.
Whittaker).
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provided for a uniform federal law on aviation product liability, eliminated joint and several liability (except for defects in airplanes or their parts), and prohibited actions for
injuries caused by products beyond their useful lives.18 7 In
addition to these bills, Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas proposed an amendment to a separate
Senate bill under consideration at the time.1 88 Despite
strong arguments in favor of timely Congressional response, the 99th Congress adjourned without further action
on any of the bills.
Soon after the opening of the 100th Congress, however,
Senator Kassebaum introduced the first of many bills entifled the "General Aviation Accident Liability Standards
Acts.' 8 9 In providing a rationale for her proposals, Senator
Kassebaum expressed her view that the existing product liability environment had caused the "erosion of U.S. general
aviation competitiveness."1 90 The Senator also commented
on the fact that "[t] he Federal interest and presence in aviation is all pervasive except in one area - litigation is conducted under individual and widely varying state laws." 19'
The Kassebaum proposal, substantially similar to its 1986
precursors, 192 contains comprehensive rules on liability,
Id.
- Kassebaum Amendment No. 1823, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 132 CONG.
REc. S5427 (daily ed. May 5, 1986). The amendment attempted to incorporate the
general aviation provisions as an addition to S.100, a bill involving the creation of a
uniform product liability law. Id.
189 S.473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. S1802 (daily
ed. Feb. 4, 1987).
190 133 CONG. REc. S1802 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) (statements of Sen. Kassebaum).
187

191

Id.

Perhaps the primary difference between S.473 and Senator Kassebaum's earlier proposed amendment, discussed supra at note 187, is the 20-year statute of repose provided by the more recent bill. S.473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, reprinted in
133 CONG. REC. 2912 (1987). The 1986 proposed amendment sought a much
shorter 12-year statute of repose. Kassebaum Amendment No. 1823, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 207. Such provisions prevent any actions for injuries or harm from being
asserted against aviation manufacturers if not brought within a number of years
from the date of sale or lease of a product. These particular provisions have proved
particularly controversial. Wells, supra note 181, at 922. In the various Senate and
House bills proposed between 1986 and 1993, the time limitations have fluctuated
between 12 and 20 years, apparently to appease opponents of the bill. Obviously,
the aviation industry supports as short a time period as possible since many believe it
192
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comparative responsibility, and remedial measures
designed to ease the burden of liability insurance on aviation manufacturers. Included in the proposal is a statutory
scheme ofjurisdiction over aviation torts, which would give
federal courts original jurisdiction concurrent with state
courts in all civil actions involving injuries arising out of an
1 93
aviation accident.
The jurisdictional provisions of the Kassebaum proposals
appear much more pro-defendant than the exclusive jurisdiction rules suggested by Senator Tydings and Judge Hall
decades earlier.1 94 The bills fail to eliminate from admiralty
is unfair to hold a manufacturer liable for a product even ten years after a sale, when
many of its parts may have been changed or altered. 132 CONG. REc. E2998 (daily
ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statements of Rep. Nelson).
13 S. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1987). The full text of the statute reads as
follows:
§ 13. (a) The district courts of the United States, concurrently with the
State courts, shall have original jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy, in all civil actions for harm arising out of a
general aviation accident and in all actions for indemnity or
contribution....
(b) A civil action which is brought in a State court may be removed
to the district court of the United States for the district embracing the
place where the action is pending, without the consent of any other
party and without regard to the amount in controversy, by any defendant against whom a claim in such action is asserted for harm arising
out of a general aviation accident.
(c) In any case commenced in or removed to a district court of the
United States under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the court
shall have jurisdiction to determine all claims under State law that
arise out of the same general aviation accident, if a substantial question of fact is common to the claims under State law and to the Federal claim, defense, or counterclaim.
(d) (1) A civil action in which the district courts of the United States
have jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section may be brought
only in a district in which (A) the accident giving rise to the claim occurred; or
(B) any plaintiff or defendant resides.
(2) In an action pending in a district court of the United States
under paragraph (1) of this subsection, a district court may, on motion of any party or its own motion, transfer the action to any other
district for the convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of
justice.
Id. This provision has remained similar in all subsequent versions of the General
Aviation Accident Liability Acts prior to 1993.
194 See supra notes 145-49 & 158 and accompanying text.
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all aviation cases; rather, they simply ensure that federal
courts may share jurisdiction over aviation cases that would
not otherwise qualify for a federal forum on separate
grounds. 195 In some cases - such as City of New York v. Waterfront Airways, 96 where admiralty provided a sole basis for
filing a federal suit - the Kassebaum bill would certainly
help by leaving no question as to proper jurisdiction. The
main shortcoming of the proposals arises when considering
19" and Icecases such as Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire
1
98
landic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., where the
courts have uniformly allowed admiralty law to apply in
cases involving helicopter crashes in international waters.
In these cases, the defendants could not recover for damages not traditionally recognized under admiralty law. The
Kassebaum proposals, by providing for concurrent rather
than exclusive jurisdiction, simply add yet another basis for
federal jurisdiction to such accidents. This would subject
both parties to even more confusion within the procedural
maze harboring borderline admiralty/aviation cases.
In addition, although the proposals provide some measure of predictability via the preemption rules for conflicting state laws,1 99 it is unclear whether the Kassebaum
provisions will override statutory damage provisions such as
state wrongful death statutes 200 and the Death on the High
Seas Act.20 1 While the proposal does explicitly apply to
195 Wells, supra note 181, at 931. Wells does not address the admiralty problems
in his Comment.
- See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
197 477 U.S. 207 (1986). See supra notes 108-117 and accompanying text.
198 722 F. Supp. 942 (D. Conn. 1989). See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying
text.

- Kassebaum Amendment No. 1823, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at § 204. The text of
the preemption provision reads as follows:
§ 204 (1986). (a) This title supersedes any State law regarding recovery, under any legal theory, for harm arising out of a general aviation
accident, to the extent that this title establishes a rule of law or procedure applicable to the claim.
Id.

200

All states have statutes governing wrongful death claims. W. PAGE KEETON ET
OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984).

AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
20!

46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988).
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death resulting from bodily injury,2 °2 it does not set limits
on recovery. Instead, the bill simply limits punitive damages to the extent that "the claimant establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the direct result of conduct manifesting a conscious, flagrant indifference to the safety of those persons who might be
23
harmed by use of the general aviation aircraft involved."

Absent any actual provision for wrongful death, state and
existing federal provisions must presumably still apply.
Thus, the Kassebaum proposals do not address the
problems of DOHSA and state law preemption, at least
where issues other than punitive damages are concerned.
No provisions exist for recovery of economic damages,
such as loss of income or replacement costs. The proposals
do, however, allow for the potential recovery of emotional
distress damages, 20 4 a category not recognized under admi-

ralty law. 5 Plaintiffs of general aviation cases could therefore apply the Kassebaum proposals, overriding admiralty
law, at least to the extent that the suit involves damages for
emotional harm.
Hence, for the purposes of the jurisdictional dilemma,
the Kassebaum proposals only provide an alternative forum
for aviation torts, rather than eliminating the confusion of
admiralty law. This confusion cannot be entirely unexpected because the stated purpose behind the bill is to
"limit the liability of a general aviation manufacturer to
those situations where, through fault of the manufacturer,
its product causes an injury," rather than to clean up the
judicial mechanism.2 0 6 The jurisdictional provisions only

serve as a means, not as an end. In contrast, the Tydings
bills of the 1960s appear much more effective in achieving
-"2 Kassebaum Amendment No. 1823 at § 203(6) (B).
Id. § 210.
Id. § 204(6)(D).
205 See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text for discussion of Morgan v.
United Air Lines, 750 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Colo. 1990). Note that the facts of Morgan
involved a commercial flight and would therefore not fall under the "general aviation" category required by the Kassebaum proposals. See supra note 182.
206 Wells, supra note 181, at 934.
2o3
204
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jurisdictional uniformity by foreclosing a procedural
branch rather than adding another option. What the
newer bills do accomplish is to publicize the notion that
aviation tort cases belong in the federal courts as opposed
to state courts.
Unfortunately, the many disputes over such a wide-ranging bill proved insurmountable, and the 100th Congress
killed both Senator Kassenbaum's 1987 proposal and a similar House bill 20 7 introduced the same year.2 0° The 101st
Congress had the opportunity to consider virtually identical
bills introduced in 1989, but again failed to pass either provision. 0 9 A Senate report given by the Committee on the
Judiciary outlined specific reasons for their rejection of the
bills. Most of the criticisms focused on policy reasons, such
as the difficulty of blaming the aviation industry's decline
solely on liability insurance. 10 In response to the argument
that extensive federal regulation of the aviation industry
warranted uniform federal law, the Committee remarked
that
[the] general aviation industry is one of many industries that
are subject to limited Federal safety controls .... The creation of national product liability standards for the general
aviation industry is contrary to historical precedent and
would establish a dangerous standard to follow. Unlike the
areas of patent or admiralty law, there is no special historical or constitutional precedent
that would support national
21 1
standards for aviation law.
Furthermore, the Report took exception to many of the
substantive provisions of the bill, including the jurisdictional portion. Specifically, the Report stated that the provisions allowing concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
H.R. 2238, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Rep. Glickman).
-o8 SeeWells, supra note 181, at 897 n.9 (citing Bradley, Aircraft ManufacturersHope
Congress Faces Products Liability Issue, WICHrrA Bus. J., Aug. 28, 1989, at 13 col.1.).
- S. 640, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1307, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
Both bills died in committee. See S. Rep. No. 303, 101st Gong., 2d Sess. (1990),
available at 1990 WL 259304, LH (Leg. Hist.) database.
210 S. Rep. No. 303, 1990 WL 259304, at 3.
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over aviation cases would waste federal judicial resources
and complicate decisions by creating fifty different interpretations of the bill in addition to additional versions in
the federal courts.212
D.

FUTURE HOPES -

WHERE Do WE

Go FROM HERE?

During the three years following the unfavorable Senate
Report, Senator Kassebaum introduced two more versions
of her aviation proposal. 1 Perhaps in an effort to appease
the many opponents of the bills, the newer jurisdictional
sections granted federal concurrent jurisdiction of general
aviation cases only in actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.214 This new restriction does little
more than weaken an already questionable provision. The
restriction would predictably compel individual plaintiffs,
with smaller claims, to resort increasingly to admiralty
grounds in order to gain the advantages of federal jurisdiction when unable to assert the rules of the Kassebaum bills.
At any rate, Congressional inaction again prevailed and
none of the proposals had passed by the close of the 103rd
Session. After several years of unsuccessful attempts with
the General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Acts, Senator Kassebaum introduced the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993 on September 14, 1993.21- The new bill
dealt solely with creating a fifteen-year statute of repose on
civil actions brought against aircraft manufacturers or manufacturers of general aviation component parts. 2 16 The re-

stricted scope of the new bill substantially increased its
212

Id. at *6.

S. 645, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 67, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Similar bills were also introduced in the House by Representatives McEwen (H.R. 2815,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)) and Glickman (H.R. 5362, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992)).
214 S. 67, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1993).
215 S. 1458, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). An identical bill was sent to the House
Public Works and Transportation Committee. H.R. 3087, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
The author would like to thank Mr. Michael J. Horak, Press Secretary to Senator
Kassebaum, for providing timely help and information related to this legislation.
216
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chances for passage, initially garnering the support of more
than a third of the Senate roster, whereas a House version
signed on nearly half of the Representatives as cosponsors.2 17 Because the new bill did not change any product
liability laws related to rules of evidence, punitive damages,
or jurisdiction, the bill stood a much greater chance of passing than Senator Kassebaum's earlier, more comprehensive
bills. 18 The Senator's revised strategy finally paid off when
President Clinton signed Senate Bill 1458 into law on August 17, 1994.219
From the success of Senate Bill 1458, it seems reasonable
to predict that a piecemeal approach to revising the system
of aviation litigation may be in process. Given the difficulties in passing legislation as broad as the General Aviation
Liability Acts proposed between 1986 and early 1993, the
better tactic appears to be to introduce statutory provisions
gradually over a period of time. For now, however, no one
appears actively concerned with promulgating uniform jurisdictional rules related to aviation torts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the judicial inconsistencies and uncertainties inherent in applying admiralty law to aviation torts, and the
seemingly fortuitous circumstances that require maritime
law to be invoked, this comment suggests that litigants in
borderline aviation/admiralty cases no longer risk asserting
admiralty as a separate jurisdictional grounds for filing in
federal courts. Possible solutions to this problem have recently been proposed, with the jurisdictional provisions
under the Kassebaum bills providing for a uniform system
of laws governing aviation accidents. Because of the rela217 William M. Bulkeley, SmaU-Plane Makers May Get a Big Lift From Congress,WALL
ST. J., Oct. 19, 1993, at B1, B9. Michael Horak provided the senatorial cosponsorship data, available as of January, 1994.
218 Public Release from Senator Nancy Kassebaum, November 16, 1993.
219 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
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tively restricted scope of these bills, however, their impact
on the procedural problems may prove minimal.
The better solution would be to reintroduce the Tydings
proposals of the 1960s. By vesting exclusive jurisdiction
over all aviation torts, rather than solely those involving
general, non-commercial aviation manufacturers, more predictability would benefit litigants and fewer procedural obstacles would clutter the federal and state dockets.
Furthermore, with the general trends towards uniform
rules for the aviation industry, exclusive federal jurisdiction
ensures a corresponding uniformity in application.
It seems appropriate close by taking note of the late
Judge Pierson Hall's remarks at a Federal Bar Association
meeting, in which he lamented the legislature's disregard
of the Tydings bills ever since Senator Tydings retired from
the Senate.220
I was thinking one night of the number of directions
from which an object moving on land could be hit by another object moving on land. Well, there are 360 degrees to
the compass, so he could be hit from 360 different points.
I then pondered about an object moving in the sea being
hit by another object moving in the sea. That turned out to
be 180 times 360 - 64,800 different points.
Of course, my curiosity then took me to the collision of
objects moving in the air, and, that is 360 times 360, and it
turns out that such an object can be hit from 129,600 directions or points of the compass.
So why shouldn't there be a separate law of the air?2 '
The federal courts have a law of the land, a law of the sea
so why not a law of the air? Admiralty and aviation simply
do not mix. Those that attempt to combine the two, naturally do so at their own risk.

221

See supra note 176.
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